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Abstract 
In 1998 the Swedish national sickness insurance policy changed to allow 
additional compensation from e.g. collective agreements after the 90
th day of 
absence without a reduction of the public sickness benefit. We estimate the 
effects of this policy change on the duration of sickness absence for employees 
in the municipal sector. After the change in policy, this group received 10 
percentage points additional compensation during day 91 to 360 in a sick leave. 
The results indicate that durations of at least 91 days increased by 4.7 days on 
average. As a consequence, the cost for the national sickness insurance 
increased by 3.0 percent. For the supplementary insurance to cover its total 
cost, insurance premiums should be increased by 22 percent. 
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1  Introduction 
The current Swedish social insurance system consists of numerous insurance 
policies targeted at the working age population; examples include sickness-
absence compensation, disability retirement, paid parental leave, child 
allowance and income support. To this, one should add the generous 
unemployment insurance, which is not classified in Sweden as a part of the 
social insurance system. The total public cost of these insurance policies 
amounts to almost 10 percent of national GDP.  
During the 1990s, the national sickness insurance system changed 
frequently and most changes led to reductions of the replacement level during 
sickness absence. In the beginning of the 1990s the replacement level was 90 
percent and the subsequent reductions were motivated by a relatively high level 
of sickness absence and the economic crisis in Sweden (Sjögren Lindquist & 
Wadensjö, 2005). In addition to the replacement from public sickness 
insurance, employees working where collective agreements are present can 
receive additional compensation from collective sickness insurances. The 
extent of these insurances is negotiated between the employers’ associations 
and the labour unions. Between March 1991 and January 1998 no additional 
compensation from collective insurances was allowed after the 90
th day of 
sickness absence due to a reduction policy
1 in the national sickness insurance. 
In January 1998 the policy was changed as the government had the opinion that 
the collectively agreed insurance solutions were discriminated by the policy in 
comparison to private insurance solutions. After the policy change additional 
compensation from collective insurances of up to 10 percent of the wage after 
the 90
th day of absence was allowed. The ceiling on the additional 
compensation had two motivations: the replacement level should not be so high 
that the costs in the public insurance increased and differences in conditions 
between groups on the Swedish labour market should not be too large. 
(Government bill 1996/97:63)  
In connection to the policy change, collectively agreed insurance for 
absence longer than 90 days was reintroduced for two groups on the Swedish 
labour market. Both blue-collar workers in the private sector and employees in 
 
1 The compensation from the national sickness insurance should be reduced by the amount 
received from collectively agreed insurance policies. the municipal sector
2 were granted ten percent of their wage in additional 
sickness absence compensation for day 91 to 360 of their absence spell. The 
policy change did not affect the additional compensation for the two other 
groups on the Swedish labour market – central government employees and 
white-collar workers in the private sector. 
Previous studies have shown that the replacement rate increases the 
individual’s absence – at least for relatively short term absence. For example, 
Johansson & Palme (2005) finds that a decrease in the replacement rate during 
the first days of sickness absence decreases both incidence and prevalence. No 
previous study has analyzed the effect of replacement rate changes for long 
term sickness absence. It has only been analyzed in aggregate numbers in one 
published report (Lidwall et al, 2004), where the effect is hard to disentangle 
due to simultaneous replacement rate changes for short-term absence. In 
addition, no previous study has analyzed the effects of collectively agreed 
sickness absence compensation.  
This essay aims to estimate the effect of replacement level change on the 
length of long-term sickness absence of an increased replacement rate caused 
by the change in reduction policy. The continued restriction on additional 
compensation was partly motivated by the ambition of keeping the costs of the 
public sickness insurance unaffected. For this reason it is interesting to examine 
whether there were any effects of the increased replacement and what the 
possibly increased length of absence implies for the costs in the national 
sickness insurance.  
In relation to earlier studies, the present one brings new knowledge on 
economic incentives’ effect on individuals who already have been absent for a 
long period of time. These individuals have doctors’ certificates of illnesses 
which justify a long period of absence and as they already have been absent 
from work for at least three months they are accustomed to not working. 
The data used in this essay comes from a database covering the entire 
Swedish population between 16 and 64 years of age. This database includes 
e.g. income variables from the tax register. To this dataset, sickness absence 
spell data from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency has been matched. 
The results show that the increased replacement rate due to the 
reintroduction of collectively agreed additional sickness compensation for sick 
spells of at least 91 days increases the conditional sickness absence duration by 
                                                      
2 In this essay we also include counties and congregations into the municipal sector. 
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on average 4.7 days. As a consequence of the increased duration, the costs for 
the publicly provided sickness absence insurance for spell durations of 91 to 
360 days increased with 3.0 percent. In total for municipal workers with 
incomes below the ceiling, the public cost increased with 102 million SEK for 
sick spells started in 1999. If the insurance should bear the full burden of the 
policy, insurance premiums should be increased by at least 22 percent.  
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section offers a brief survey of 
previous studies and their findings. This section also includes a discussion on 
how economic incentives could affect sickness absent individuals at a late stage 
of sickness absence. Section 3 presents the Swedish national sickness insurance 
and the collectively agreed sickness insurance. In section 4, the identification 
strategy is presented together with the econometric specification. The data are 
presented in section 5 and the results in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2  Sickness absence and economic 
incentives 
The numerous changes in the Swedish sick leave replacement rate have 
affected the direct cost of sickness absence for the individual and the income 
lost during sick leave is likely to affect an individual’s willingness to call in 
sick. Five studies on the effect of the cost of being absent on sickness absence 
behaviour are presented in Table 1. 
Three published studies by Johansson and Palme deal with sickness absence 
among Swedish blue-collar workers. The study published in 1996 shows that 
the direct cost of being absent has a negative effect on male sickness absence. 
The second study, published in 2002, shows that increased cost of being absent 
decreases the incidence of sick leave and increases the intensity of returning to 
work if absent. In the third study (2005), they analyze the effect of the 
reduction in the sickness absence benefit on March 1st 1991, finding a negative 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  7 Henrekson and Persson (2004) study the effect of changes in the sickness 
insurance system on the sickness absence rate using aggregated Swedish time-
series data covering 1955-1999. Their finding is that the generosity of the 
sickness insurance system significantly affects the sickness absence behaviour. 
Lidwall et al. (2004) find, in a similar study on the average number of sick days 
using a time-series from 1955 to 2002, that some of the reforms in the sickness 
insurance system have had a significant effect on the absence rate. Lidwall et 
al. also make a separate analysis of long-term absence finding significant 
effects of the restrictive reforms on the number of long absence spells each 
month. 
Thus, according to all these results, there seem to be a positive relationship 
between the sick-leave replacement rate and sickness absence. None of the 
previous studies take direct consideration to changes in the collectively agreed 
compensation. The collectively agreed compensation increases the 
compensation level for some groups on the Swedish labour market and causes 
differences between groups which may be important when measuring effects of 
replacement level changes.  
2.1  Long-term sickness absence and economic incentives 
If an individual’s current health-status ranges from extremely poor to extremely 
good, then there is a certain level of health under which it is impossible for any 
individual to attend work or fulfil any relevant tasks; i.e. these individuals 
cannot be affected by any economic incentives. At the top end of the health-
distribution there is a level over which no doctor would sick-list an individual 
as the health – if visible – is too good to qualify the individual as ill or work 
limited. In between the two levels is a grey zone where it is possible – to 
different extents – for an individual to attend work but it is also possible to get 
a doctor’s certificate of illness. In Sweden, a physician is only supposed to 
write a certificate of illness for an individual who have such an impaired health 
due to illness that he/she can not fulfil his/hers ordinary – or possible 
temporary – work-assignments
3.  
                                                      
3 If the working ability is limited by less than ¼ then no sickness benefits should be available. 
The extent of the working-time the individual is sick-listed should reflect the extent of the 
impaired working ability.  If the individual is unable to perform ¼ of the daily work then he/she 
is supposed to be sick-listed for ¼ of the working-time only (Lag (1962:381) om allmän 
försäkring). 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  8  
Two surveys were made in one Swedish county (Englund & Svärdsudd, 
2000 and Englund, 2001) showing that doctors often issue certificates of illness 
on the patient’s own initiative despite that they would not recommend sickness 
absence for the patient. This indicates that the patient can have a strong 
influence on the sickness absence even if a doctor’s certificate is required. 
The final decision to sick-list an individual in Sweden is made by the Social 
Insurance Office – the doctor’s certificate is only a recommendation. The cases 
where the Social Insurance Office has made a decision against the doctor’s 
recommendation are few but have increased during the last few years
4 
(Försäkringskassan, 2005). The obvious final decision is made by the 
individual; he or she can choose not to prolong the sick-listing or choose to 
return to work earlier.  
If the individual can choose between staying absent and returning to work 
and is indifferent between the two alternatives at the current health-status, 
working-conditions, replacement level etc, then theoretically a change in the 
replacement-level can affect the decision of attending or not attending work 
(Holmlund, 1991). None of the studies presented in Section 2 discusses how/if 
economic incentives can affect sickness absent individuals after a long period 
of absence. The incentives, analyzed in this report, changes after three months 
of absence and the magnitude of their effect can not be predicted using 
previous results. 
3  Sick-leave compensation in Sweden 
3.1  The national sickness insurance 
Private insurance for wage replacement during sickness absence has been 
available in Sweden since the mid 18
th century. In the late 19
th century, the 
government started to regulate the sick leave insurance market and subsidized 
parts of the administrative costs (Edebalk, 2005). Publicly provided sickness 
insurance was introduced in 1955 and were from the beginning (and still is) an 
income replacement insurance.  
                                                      
4 The share of applications for new or continuing sickness benefits not granted were 0.69 percent 
in May 2005. 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  9 The Swedish sick leave compensation scheme has been changed numerous 
times during the 1990s, affecting both the compensation level and the 
employer’s responsibility for the sick leave compensation (the sick-pay period). 
The replacement levels, from employers and from the sickness insurance, for 
the relevant time-period – between 1997 and 2003 – are presented in Table 2.  
A doctor’s certificate is required from the 8
th day of sickness absence. 
In 1996 and 1997, the government-provided sick leave replacement rate was 
75 percent of the lost income. The sick-pay period was extended to 28 days 
during the period January 1997 to March 1998, at April 1st 1998, it returned to 
14 days. The replacement rate was raised to 80 percent of lost income in 






Table 2. Replacement rates from employers (sick-pay) and from the National 
Sickness Insurance (sickness benefit) by sickness duration, 1997-2003. 
Day in  
sick leave 
Jan 1997-  
Dec 1997 
Jan 1998-  
Mar 1998 
Apr 1998 –  
June 2003 
  Empl. NSI Empl. NSI Empl. NSI 
1  0 0 0  0  0 0 
2-14  75 0  80  0  80 0 
15-28  75 0  80  0  (10)  80 
29-90  (10) 75 (10)  80  (10) 80 
91-360  0 75  (10)*  80  (10)*  80 
361-  0 75  0  80 0 80 
Note: The figures to the left hand side for each time period show the sick-pay from employers, 
figures in brackets indicate compensation regulated through collective agreements. Figures 
denoted by an asterisk indicate collective agreements covering only blue-collar workers in the 
private sector and workers in the municipal sector. The figures to the right hand side for every 
time period show the replacement level (of income under the ceiling – income over the ceiling is 
not compensated) in the national sickness insurance. 
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3.2  Collective agreements 
In 1899, the first collective agreement regulating sickness compensation was 
introduced covering brewery workers in Stockholm. The number of collective 
agreements including sickness benefits increased rapidly during the following 
20 years, and in 1921 more than 800 collective agreements (mainly local) 
covering fully 25 percent of the labour force included sickness absence 
compensation schemes.  (Edebalk, 2005) 
As a consequence of the introduction of publicly provided sickness 
insurance in 1955, some groups (mainly private white-collar workers) were 
facing a reduction in compensation if their collective agreement regulated 
compensation was removed. This lead to renegotiation of many collective 
agreements which resulted in, for example, extra compensation and sick-pay 
during the waiting days in the national sickness insurance. In the beginning of 
the 1970’s, collectively agreed additional sickness compensation covering 
municipal employees and private blue-collar workers took effect. 
The replacement levels in the national sickness insurance were lowered in 
March 1991 and at the same time a reduction policy was introduced in the 
sickness insurance. The new policy implied that any extra compensation after 
the 90
th day in a sickness absence spell would lead to an equivalent reduction of 
the benefit paid by the national sickness insurance
5. In January 1998 this policy 
was changed, allowing extra compensation up to a maximum of 10 percent of 
the normal wage during all days of sickness absence.  
The size of the extra compensation was negotiated between the employers’ 
associations and the labour unions during 1998. The agreement covering blue-
collar workers in the private sector was signed in June 1998 and implied ten 
percent in additional compensation between day 91 and day 360 of a sickness 
absence spell
6. The agreement covering employees in the municipal sector was 
signed at the end of December 1998 and gave the same additional 
compensation. Both agreements came into effect retroactively as of the 1st of 
January 1998. This meant that individuals who had been absent during 1998 
could receive compensation retroactively. 
                                                      
5 The part of the income that was over the ceiling of 7.5 base amounts could be compensated to 
the same rate as the income under the ceiling without any reductions of the national sickness 
benefit. This base amount follows the Swedish consumer price index and is annually 
recalculated. 
6 This compensation was paid through private insurance provided by employers. 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  11 White-collar workers in the private sector and employees in the central 
government sector have had additional sickness absence compensation after the 
90
th day of absence, during the studied time-period, only if they had an annual 
income higher than the ceiling in the national sickness insurance
7. Their 
additional sickness absence compensation was equally generous before and 
after the change of the reduction policy. (Försäkringskassan, 2006)  
The conditions for private insurances giving compensation during sickness-
absence did not change when the policy changed on the 1
st of January 1998. 
Private insurance for income loss due to sickness absence was allowed despite 
the reduction policy – this policy only regulated collectively agreed compen-
sation. 
The changes in the collectively agreed compensation in 1998 implied that 
all employees, with incomes below the ceiling, had the same level of 
replacement during all days of the sickness absence spell except from day 91 to 
day 360. Due to the collectively agreed compensation the employees in the 
municipal sector and blue-collar workers in the private sector have ten 
percentage points higher replacement level than all other employees from day 
91 to day 360. The collectively agreed additional compensation during sick 
leave for these two groups reduces their cost of absence by as much as 50 
percent.  
4  Identification strategy 
4.1  The policy experiment 
The replacement level, after the 90
th day of absence, is not randomly assigned 
to different individuals but assigned on the basis of sector or in the private 
sector on the basis of blue/white-collar worker. The data restricts us from 
defining the collective agreement coverage in the private sector. To make the 
identification of those affected by the additional compensation easier we 
exclude the employees in the private sector from the analysis and focus on the 
employees in the municipal and government sector.  
                                                      
7 The NSI-ceiling was 7.5 base amounts until 1
st July 2006, 7.5 base amounts was 297,750 SEK≈ 
31,410 € (June 1, 2007). 
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Individuals employed by municipalities were affected by the agreement 
signed in December 1998, whereas government employees were not – their 
compensation did not change. This can be regarded as a quasi-experiment. The 
employees in the municipal sector had as far as they knew 80 percent in 
replacement after the 90
th day of sickness-absence until the 21
st of December 
1998 when the additional compensation was introduced. They can thus be 
assumed to be unaffected by the additional compensation until then. One 
potential problem of comparing employees in these two sectors is that the 
individuals working in the different sectors may have different tasks, and 
therefore might have different absence behaviour. Furthermore, the labour 
force composition may differ between the two sectors. 
The additional compensation was not a new intervention in 1998. Before the 
ban in 1991 almost all sectors in Sweden had it, but one exception was 
government employees. This makes the introduction of additional 
compensation for municipal workers in 1998 just a reintroduction. It seems 
likely that private blue collar workers were pushing the law change as they 
were fast in reintroducing their additional compensation. As the municipal 
workers were encouraged by the private blue collar workers’ reintroduction, it 
can therefore be seen as rather exogenous for municipal workers. 
One other source of endogenity might be that individuals with bad health or 
absence proneness employed by the government change jobs to the municipal 
sector. This is not so likely. First, the labour market in Sweden during the 
1990s is characterized by high unemployment and the number of vacancies was 
low, and secondly the studied time period is short. 
The magnitude of the effect on sickness absence of the additional 
compensation depends on how well the information about the compensation 
was spread. If a large share of the employees in the municipal sector initially 
was unaware of the additional compensation the effect could be small but 
become larger with time as the information was spread. As the collective 
agreement regulating the additional sickness compensation was signed 3 days 
before Christmas Eve, the information about the replacement rate increase is 
likely to be delayed. We have found some evidence that the advertising about 
the agreement first were made in January and February 1999. This can imply 
that the insured were not aware of the compensation until then and the effect 
would be evident later in 1999 and in-turn only affect a small portion of spells 
started in 1998. 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  13 It is also possible that some employees in the municipal sector suspected the 
possibility of receiving the compensation retroactively before the decision was 
made. This would imply that some of the absence spells were affected before 
the 21
st of December 1998. This effect would reasonably be quite small as the 
extent of the compensation was not known and the date when the compensation 
was to be paid was unknown. 
4.2  Econometric specification 
To estimate the effect of the collectively agreed additional sickness 
compensation a difference-in-differences approach is used. For each sector 
(municipal   or government ( ) and time period (before  () M ) G ( ) 0 = t  and 
after ( ) 1 = t ) the average number of benefited sickness absence days ( ) SA  is 
calculated for durations of at least 91 days. Spells longer than 360 days are 
censored at day 360.  
This can be formalized as: 
 
  () ( 10 1 == = = −−−
MM GG
tt tt DiD SA SA SA SA ) 0 = . (1) 
 
The DiD estimate in (1) can be expressed as a linear regression model: 
 
  , (2)  12 3 αβ β β ε =+ + + + it it t it t it SA M T M T
 
where   is the sickness absence spell of individual i started in time period 
,   is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the individual is 
working in the municipal sector when beginning the sick spell, and   is a 





Model (2) can easily be modified to include individual characteristics:  
 
   (3)  12 3 1 1 ... αβ β β γ γ ε =+ + + + ++ + it it t it t it k kit it SA M T M T Z Z
 
where  jit Z    denotes observed individual varying covariates. 
This removes time invariant differences in sickness duration between 
individuals explained by observed individual characteristics. 
( 1, 2,.., = j ) k
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Extending the analysis to incorporate more than two time periods yields the 
following model: 
 
   (4)  12 1 1 ... αβ β γ γ τ ε =+ + + ++ ++ it it t it it k kit t it SA M T M Z Z
 
where   is a time dummy which will capture year specific time effects which 
are equal for both groups. To control for different linear time trends between 
sectors a variable can be included in the regression capturing the time trend in 
one of the sectors. 
τt
Estimating a “fixed-effect” type model using time-series data may yield 
serial correlation in the standard errors which, in turn, will give an ambiguous 
bias in the standard error estimates (Bertrand et al., 2003). One way to deal 
with this problem is to use a robust regression parameter variance estimator 
(Arellano, 1987). This variance estimator is also known as the “cluster” 
estimator and it is robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error 
term. 
5  Data 
5.1  The sample 
The data used in this study comes mainly from the IFAU-database. This 
database consists of matched employer-employee registers covering all 
individuals between 16 and 65 years of age in Sweden
8. The income variables 
are collected from tax registers and workplace information is collected from 
official registers which makes it possible to distinguish which sector an 
individual is employed in. To this dataset the sick-leave register is matched. 
This contains all sickness-absence spells compensated by the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency
9 and information on the income that the sickness absence 
compensation is based on. 
                                                      
8 From 2001 and onwards it covers all individuals between 16 and 74 years of age. 
9 There is no information included in this register on absence spells which are compensated by 
the employer and ends before the Social Insurance Office takes the responsibility of 
compensation. 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  15 To achieve the purpose of this study all individuals with sickness absence 
spells of at least 91 days during the period 1997-1999 in the municipal and the 
governmental sector are sampled. These individuals have the main part of their 
income from the respective sector the month before the sickness absence spell 
was started. All individuals which are self-employed, have an income below 
two base amounts or have an income over the sickness benefit ceiling each year 
are excluded. In the sensitivity analyses, corresponding data from 1995 to 2001 
is used. The pre- and post-treatment section uses data of sick spells of at least 
30 days up till 730 days. 
5.2  Descriptive statistics 
In 1998, most individuals are employed in the private sector (63.1 percent) and 
the second largest group is employed in the municipal sector (30.6 percent). 
The central government sector employs a relatively small part of the Swedish 
work-force with only about six percent of the employees. The share of female 
employees is not equal over the sectors: almost 80 percent of the employees in 
the municipal sector are women compared to around 40 percent in the private 
sector and central government sector.  
In Table 3 descriptive statistics are presented for the sample consisting of 
individuals in the municipal and government sector with absence spells longer 
than 90 days. Absence spells longer than 360 days are censored at day 360. As 
the additional compensation only affects the spells up till the 360s day, no 
direct effect of the additional compensation will be found for spells longer than 
360 days. The indirect effect on longer spells will be analysed separately. There 
are significant differences across sectors in the share of women, mean age, 
mean income and the conditional average number of sick days. 
The average length of the absence spells, conditional on being at least 90 
days and censored at day 360, for the two sectors during different years are 
presented in Figure 1. The average number of days in an absence spell 
increases each year in both sectors – showing parallel trends until 1999 when 
the average in the municipal sector exceeds the governmental sector for the 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for durations of at least 91 days and censored at 
day 360, all years. 
  Government employees  Municipal employees 
 Mean 
Std. 
error Min/Max  Mean 
Std. 
error Min/Max 




252.6 0.336  91/360  252.0 0.183  91/360 
Age 47.5  0.034  20/65  46.5  0.018  20/65 
Yearly income 
(100,000 sek)  1.75 0.0018  0.086/2.767  1.71 0.0008  0.090/2.767 
Number of 
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Figure 1. Average length of absence spells longer than 90 days and censored 
at day 360 in the two sectors 1995 to 2001. 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  17 6  Results 
First we estimate the baseline difference-in-differences parameter (municipal 
vs. central government employees over two time periods) on sickness absence. 
The results are presented in Table 4, where the year denotes the starting year of 
the included sickness absence spells.  
The DiD for spells started (the first day) in 1997 and 1998 yields a small 
non-significant positive increase in duration (0.8 days) of the collectively 
agreed insurance. A small or inconsiderable effect is expected as the collective 
insurance was not introduced until the 21st of December 1998 and it seems like 
the information was delayed which implies that only a few of the absence 
spells starting in 1998 would be affected by this insurance.  Performing DiD on 
absence spells starting in 1998 and 1999 gives a significant increase in sickness 
absence duration by 3.4 days.  
Using 1997 and 1999 might yield a better DiD estimate as the spells which 
started in 1997 are not affected at all by the collective insurance and the spells 
started in 1999 are likely to all be affected. The DiD estimates, using 1997 and 
1999, gives a significant increase in sickness absence by 4.1 days associated 
with the collectively agreed additional compensation. Including individual 
characteristics and county dummies increases the effect of the collectively 
agreed insurance slightly but not significantly to 4.7 days.  
The average sickness duration for municipal employees in 1999, conditional 
on at least 91 days duration and censoring at day 360, was 259.8 days. The 
findings suggest that the collectively agreed insurance yielded a 4.7 days 
increase in sickness duration of at least 91 days, i.e. a 2.8 percent increase in 
sickness durations of at least 91 days. 
6.1  Pre- and post-treatment effects 
The collectively agreed insurance affects sickness durations at day 91 to day 
360. We have ignored the potential effects occurring prior to day 91 and after 
day 360. Such pre- and post-treatment effects are certainly possible. A pre-
treatment effect might occur before day 91 and the treatment might also yield a 
lasting effect after day 360. To test this we apply the model used in Table 4 
column 4 on sickness durations of at least 30 days censored at day 90 and on 
sickness durations of at least 361 days censored at day 730. The results are 
shown in Table 5 and the time series are plotted for each group in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. No pre-treatment effect is found, i.e. the effect of the additional 
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compensation does not affect sick spells before day 91. The effect on day 361 
and onward is positive but insignificant.  
If the introduction of the collectively agreed additional insurance coincides 
with group specific health shocks or the group compositions we should find 
effects on days in sick spells before and after the ones that the insurance are 
affecting. There is no evidence to support such an explanation. 
 
 








































Woman -  -  -  3.92** 
(0.82) 
Age -  -  -  6.94** 
(0.24) 
Age sq.  -  -  -  -0.06** 
(0.00) 




- - -  17.72** 
(1.02) 









No.  obs.  108,441 127,065 116,878 116,878 
R-sq.  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
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least 30 days, censored at day 90, and durations of at least 360 days, 
censored at day 730.  
 
Durations of at least 30 days,
censored at day 90 
Durations of at least 361 days, 
censored at day 730 




No. obs.  250,393  49,433 
R-sq. 0.01  0.04 
Note: Second year dummy, municipal dummy, individual characteristics, county dummies and an 
intercept are included in the models but not presented (equivalent to the last model in Table 4). 
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Figure 2. Average length of absence spells of at least 30 days and censored at 
day 90 in the two sectors 1995 to 2001. 
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Figure 3. Average length of absence spells of at least 361 days and censored 
at day 730 in the two sectors 1995 to 2001. 
6.2  Sensitivity analyses 
In  Table 6, the estimates of some sensitivity analyses are presented. DiD 
estimates are presented as effects of hypothetical compensation changes 
affecting only municipal employees before and after the real change (a 
“placebo effect”). This placebo analysis is a way of examining whether the 
previous results are due to different time trends in the two sectors. The results 
show small non-significant “placebo effects” without a clear time pattern, 
which indicates that a sector specific time trend is unlikely.  
One interesting pattern in Table 6 is that the time invariant municipal effect 
is negative in the pre-1998 DiD’s, whereas positive in the post-1998 DiD’s. 
This indicates that a structural change has occurred in sector relative sickness 
absence before and after 1998, which is in accordance with our main results. 
In Table 7 the time-period 1995 to 2001, excluding 1998, is used to estimate 
the effect of the reintroduction of the collective sickness absence insurance. 
The years prior to 1998 and the years subsequent to 1998 are used to estimate 
the structural break during 1998. This yields an estimated effect of 3.9 days 
increase in duration due to the additional compensation, controlling for 
individual characteristics and local county effects. In the second model of 
IFAU – Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation  21 Table 7 the prior model is enhanced with a control for a time-trend specific to 
the municipal sector. In this model the estimated effect of the additional 
compensation is an increase in the sickness absence duration by 5.6 days. 
According to the estimate no specific linear time-trend in the municipal sector 
is evident as the parameter is small and far from significant. None of the results 
in Table 7 differ significantly from the main DiD result (in Table 4).  
 
 










































No.  obs.  100,079 96,291 142,447  152,086 
Note: Individual characteristics, county dummies and an intercept are included in the models but 
not presented (equivalent to the model used in Table 4, last column). Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. 
 













linear trend   
-0.40 
[0.33] 
No. obs.  369,043 369,043 
Note: Individual characteristics, county dummies, time dummies and an intercept are included in 
the models but not presented. County clustered robust standard errors in brackets, * Significant at 
5%, ** significant at 1%. 
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7  Economic implications 
The national sickness insurance replacement rate during 1998 to June 2003 was 
80 percent of estimated annual earnings and the amount per day is calculated 
by dividing this amount by the number of days per year. Thus, all calendar days 
were benefited by an amount relative to the per calendar day income loss. On 
average, using all sick spells started in 1999 by municipal employees with 
income below the ceiling, the number of benefited days for durations of at least 
91 days followed till day 360 was 169.8. The corresponding average amount of 
benefits paid was 64,728 SEK per person.  
To avoid the assumption of equal treatment effect for all incomes, the 
average increase in the amount benefits paid due to the collective agreement is 
estimated by adopting the model used in Table 4 column 4 on actual paid 
benefits. The result shows on an average increase in costs for the public 
sickness insurance by 1,882 SEK per sick spell. This yields that the public cost 
were increased by 3.0 percent due to the collectively agreed insurance.  
The number of sick spells (longer than 90 days) started in 1999 by 
municipal employed individuals with income below the ceiling amounted to 
54,241. This yields that the total cost for the Swedish Social Security Agency 
was increased by 102 million SEK. The true amount is likely to be larger as 
individuals with salaries over the income ceiling are excluded in this analysis. 
Assuming that the workers in each sector contributes on average the same 
amount to the sickness insurance through pay-roll taxes, the municipal 
employees are only contributing approximately 30 percent of the increased 
public cost due to the collectively agreed insurance.
10  
The cost for the collectively agreed insurance was 10 percent of the daily 
income loss, during day 91 to 360 in a sick spell. For sick spells started in 1999 
by municipal employed individuals with income below the ceiling, the total 
potential cost
11 amounted to 439 million SEK and is financed by insurance 
premiums paid by the employer. To cover the increased cost for the national 
sickness insurance the premiums should be increased by 22 percent. As the 
municipal employers is assumed to be contributing 30 percent of the increased 
public cost through pay-roll taxes, the net increased cost for the employer 
should be just under 16 percent. 
                                                      
10 In 1999, 30.5 percent of the labour force is working within the municipal sector.  
11 If all beneficiaries are claiming the additional compensation.  
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The reintroduction in end of 1998 of the collectively agreed additional sickness 
compensation of 10 percent for sick spells of at least 91 days increased the 
conditional absence duration by 4.7 days according to our results. No 
corresponding effect is found prior to the 91
st day or after the 360
th day in 
sickness absence.  
The cost for the public sickness insurance was increased due to the reintro-
duction of the collective agreed insurance. For municipal workers, the cost 
during day 91 to 360 in the sickness absence spells for the public sickness 
insurance increased on average with 3.0 percent. In total, the cost of municipal 
workers sickness absence started in 1999 was increased by 102 million SEK of 
the insurance. Thus, not all the costs of the collectively agreed sickness 
insurance are borne by the insurance beneficiaries. If the additional insurance 
took full burden of its costs, the insurance premium should be increased by 22 
percent. 
The ten percentage units increase in sickness compensation from 80 to 90 
percent results in a 12.5 percentage increase in compensation. Thus, the 
increase by 2.8 percent in conditional sickness absence duration by the 
compensation shift yields an elasticity of 0.22. Increasing the compensation by 
1 percent thus leads to a 0.22 percent increase in number of days in absence 
between day 91 and 360. In comparison to the elasticity of 4.6, as calculated in 
Johansson & Palme (1996) for all spell lengths, this elasticity is small but 
seems quite realistic. The individuals affected by the additional compensation 
have been absent from work for a long period of time and probably have worse 
health conditions. 
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